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When it comes to race, the United States often resembles Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland. With its unac­
knowledged legacy of ’«diite supremacy, skewed logic of racial purity, largely unquestioned goal of manifest 
destiny, and absurd racial boundaries, some people are made giants by their racial status while others are 
capriciously dwarfed. As a person with multiracial heritage, I have on too many occasions wondered, as 
Ahce did, “Is it me or this wacky garden?”
While the racial legacies of this country have often left me dumbfounded, angry, and confused, the 
purposeful and imaginative thinking of fellow intellectuals has just as often come to the rescue. Several 
years dgo, I came across three texts sequentially, the authors of which served as interlocutors in decipher­
ing this troubling Wonderland; Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) by Richard Rorty, “Sex Work/ 
Sex Act: Law, Labor and Desire in Constructions of Prostitution” (1997) by Noah Zatz, and “A Black Femi­
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics” (1990) by Kimberle Crenshaw. This paper has been 
through four versions as I have attempted to reconcile each of these three author’s insights with my own 
thinking about race. My choice to engage Rorty and Zatz in particular—although race is a fulcrum for 
neither of their arguments—^is based on two things. First, that ideas present themselves in our hves out­
side of a teleologically consistent or knowable plan and can often be enhsted to help us in the challenges, 
intellectual and otherwise, we are facing. And second, careful thinking about one issue can offer insights 
into others that seem at first sight to be unrelated.
The first version of this essay begins with an experience of racial afienation that I had a few years ago 
in a Friendly’s restaurant in New York’s Hudson Valley. I had the opportunity to share that version with the 
listeners of my local pubfic radio station. As if putting my ideas out into the universe brought new ones 
back, a fiiend gave me Rorty’s book Contingency just after the radio broadcast. My thinking with and against 
Rorty’s;became an addendum to that first essay in a second version. While I was still muUing over Rorty’s 
argument, my subscription to the feminist scholarly journal Signs arrived in the mail with Zatz’s article on 
prostitution. I wrote a third version. And just after I thought I had put the essay down for a final time, a 
colleague lent me David Karyis’s edited volume, The Politics of Law, fi-om which Crenshaw’s chapter called 
out to me ffom the table of contents. She offered up more wisdom, the result being a fourth version. Since 
closing Crenshaw’s article, I have continued to talk about these issues with colleagues. Their questions, 
concerns and insights have led me to this version of the essay.
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In each incarnation, the essay took on additional topics—^whiteness and the Macy of racial purity, 
the persistence of racism, allegiance to mono-racial or multiracial identities, the challenges posed each, 
the functions of racial boundaries, and the relationship of the race system to other oppressive systems. In 
this paper, then, I have left the meandaiig'of my thinking in tact as Fretrace my way from e3q)erience to 
reflection to meta-reflection and back again.
I. How Friendly?
On a warm and sunny day almost a year ago, my favorite Friendly’s R^taurant beckoned me from the 
other side of the Hudson River. After finishing a quick lunch, I noticed the name tag of the waitress who 
acted as cashier when I went to pay my bill. Her last name: my mother’s maiden name. Although I had 
only recently moved to New York State, my mother’s parents and grandparents were all from this area. Excited 
by &e possibility of familial, if distant, connection, I smiled. The social person in me who makes conversa­
tion with tollbooth collectors and fellows waiting-in-line at grocery stores and movie houses started to say 
something. And then I hesitated.
Some of my friends are men and women of color who rarely make small talk with people they don’t 
know. Having suffered insults from passing cars, received chilly stares in restaurants, and been discom­
fited when fellow subway passengers stood rather than sit next to them, these friends have to decided to 
avoid small talk with white people altogether in an attempt to keep ill-wishers at arm’s length.
L-"
Thinking of them, I realized that one of the reasons I speak to strangers is motivated by a similar fear 
that discourages my friends from speaking: if I can make easy, pleasant conversation with people, espe­
cially white people, then just maybe, I will convince those who harbor prejudice that black people are in­
deed like them—human, normal, real.
One brief, unfocused look at my face and my African ancestry is unmistakable. So is my European 
ancestry. But in this society, my whiteness is not only less visible to most people, it is also less important 
and to some less real.
i ,
I looked up to the waitress’s face from her nametag, and I could not bringih^elf to speak. I wanted 
to know if she, too, had Scottish Presbyterians from Long Island in her background; to find out if we might 
be related; to ask whether any of her ancestors attended the Baptist Church in Saugerties. But she is white 
and I just did not know how she would react to my queries: “Are you one of my people? Am I one of yours?”
While I am neither paranoid nor naive, not a week goes by when I’m not absolutely sure that I’ve been 
treated badly for being black. And I wouldn’t even have to rely on my own experiences to know that racial 
discrimination still exists. I study race and racism. And I know that people still go to prison, make death 
row, get turned away from hospitals, and are denied loans because of racial prejudice.
Sometimes, in emotional exhaustion, I wonder at my own decision to keep reaching out to vriiite people. 
Then I remember that half of my family is white; I’ve grown up with and around white people; I work with 
white people. I have had white lovers, and I have best friends who are vriiite. I would trust a number of 
white people with my life. Still, to move in the public spaces of the United States as a black person—espe-
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dally those where whites far outnumber any other group—means to risk rejection every day.
I try to remind myself: “Biology is not destiny.” This is a comphcated reminder, however, for it takes 
place within legal strucmres and sodal expectations that continue to affirm and condone white supremacy.
I suppose most black people try not think about these issues on a regular basis and most of them prob­
ably do a pretty good job of ignoring or denying the pernicious, constant radsm that meets them daily in 
myriad subde ways.
What people can put out of mind, however, often shows up in thdr bodies. Rates of high blood pres­
sure, ulcers, insomnia, addiction to nicotine, asthma, adult-onset diabetes, and fatal breast, throat, and 
prostate cancer far outnumber those by whites—all indications that life as a black person in the United 
States is stressful and negatively affects the body.
Fortunatdy, many African Americans have families, friends, and community and religious organiza­
tions that affirm their humanity. Good famihes, however, are not enough. We all deserve fellow dtizens 
who treat us with dignity.
The radal difference between the waitress and me was not what kept me from reaching out. It was the 
knowledge that my difference is perceived by so many people not as neutral but as “degraded."
Reading and rereading the name tag of this woman across the cash register, I realized that I don’t just 
talk to strangers to prove my humanity, I also talk to strangers because we share humanity, because I love 
finding connection and things in common with other people. I took my change, thanked her and headed to 
the parking lot. I got in my car and headed away from the anonymity of the restaurant, back over the Hudson, 
safe from the possibility of rejection, at least for today. Away from the Friendly waitress, the cousin I will 
never know.
II. Examination
Then I read Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), by the pragmatist philosopher, Richard Rorty. 
He argues that human solidarity and compassion are more likely to occur when we reveal to those who do 
not suffer how much they have in common with those who do, rather than by emphasizing the humanity of 
the latter. People, he continues, have done each good mrns throughout history because they saw something 
of themselves in the person they helped—a fellow member of the same union or profession, or “a fellow 
bocce player, or a fellow parent of small children” (Rorty 1989:190).
Rorty examines the frameworks of Christianity and Kantian morahty that, he demonstrates, offer indi­
viduals a calculus for responding to the suffering of others. Both methods of analysis M, Rorty contends, 
because they are too broad in their assumptions of human generosity—^in Christianity, each person is con­
sidered a child of God while in Kantian morality one’s sense of mutual obligation is based on rationality. 
Neither paradigm addresses the reahty that individuals tend to Identify with smaller communities of “we” 
than “all God’s children” or “all rational beings.”
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While the Golden Rule and the theory of rational behaivior both remain common justifications for in­
dividual behavior, Rorty observes that even liberals—“people... more afraid of being cruel than an^ng 
else” (1989:192)—are more likely to respond to the suffering of others based on narrower directives.
Rorty examines a ^miliar exhortation to help those who are less fortunate^and explains in the excerpt 
that follows how it is frequently altered as a way of increasing its effectiveness.
Consider the attimde of contemporary American Hberals to the unending 
hopelessness and misery of the fives of the young blacks in American 
cities... Do we say that these people must be helped because they are 
our fellow human beings? We may, but it is much more persuasive, 
morally as well as politically, to describe them as our Ameri­
cans—to insist that it is outrageous that w.American should five without 
hope... [0]ur sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom 
solidarity is expressed'are thougjit of as “one of us,” where “us” means 
something smaller and more local than the human race. That is why 
“because she is a human being” is a weak, unconvincing explanation of a 
generous action (Rorty 1989:192).
Thus, in my public radio presentation, I had conformed to Rorty’s thesis. Whde 1 defended my daim to 
connection with the distant relatives in this region of New York State, “because I am a human being,” it was 
a risk, as an Afiican American, to claim European Americans as kin who might not claim me. That’s why I 
presented those things most of the members of my audience and I had in common, calling upon the con­
stituents of group affiliation and identity with which I expected most members of my audience to identify: 
Presbyterian, Scottish, Baptist, Saugerties, Long Island, white.
On the one hand, I imagine Rorty might find my story heuristic since it impfiddy challenges those white 
members of my listening audience to expand their definition of “we.” I also think that he would like my 
implicit punch fine, “I’m black; I have white relatives; and you might be one of .them!” Op thepther hand, 
I inmginp him wincuig vdien I explain that I make conversation with white strangers “so they might know 
that black people are like them—human, normal, real.” I think he would argue that my summation, “We 
all share humanity,” is less compelling than the specific references I make to actual people and places.
Indeed, I can further imagine Rorty asking, “Why embrace such a broad daim?” And I would answer: 
it serves a purpose. The story at once makes plain the common cultural understanding that whiteness has 
been and continues to be defined by its opposition to blackness in the United States, while undermimng 
this powerful, historical ontological duality. My story remains suspect, however, for it raises the question: 
Is she diiiming “We are the world,” or is she claiming heir to the privileges that come with whiteness?
■the fact that I have white ancestors in this region is uncontestable. What can be misconstrued in at 
least two ways are the reasons why I would wish to make this fact public. First, my focus on shared ancestry 
implies that familial assodation is legitimate only when there are provable blood rdations, and further­
more that indusion is or should be genetically based. To the contrary, what I am arguing is that our under­
standings olgroup, race, and even ancestor have been and continue to be formulated according to biol­
ogy, geography, cultural tradition and the times in which people five. This is another way of saying that
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these concepts are socially constructed. Second, it may appear that my desire to be recognized and in­
cluded is based on the possibihty that I share common ancestors with the woman in the restaurant because 
she is white. In feet, my desire to be acknowledged and included is based on the universal desire of hu­
mans to be acknowledged and included, especially by people of their kin or group, especially in a new or 
strange land. The story can be misconstrued precisely because the context of the United States is one in 
\t4iich whiteness is perceived as a privileged status, something that all (non-white) people would want if 
they could have it.
The purpose of invoking humanity, even if awkwardly then, is to discourage these misinterpretations 
that locate my argument in genetic inheritance or association with whiteness. My appeal to humanity grows 
out of a desire to expose the ways in which "black” and “white” depend on geographical, social, and tem­
poral context, as do group definition and membership. Clearly, my argument may be obscured by such a 
broad appeal. But the only alternative I see is to clarify the impUcit threat—^that is, you never know who’s 
in your group—and the threat, because it returns to genetic association, muddies the point.
Rorty’s discussion of Christianity and Kantian morality is also about the difficult task of how to encour­
age compassion without threat, fiat or the parochial response of “you are like me, so I’ll help you.” He 
suggests that we expand the bounded “we” (1989:192) so that we can really treat each other better. “We 
should stay on the lookout for marginalized people—^people whom we still instinctively think of as ‘they’ 
rather than ‘us.’ We should try to notice our similarities with them” (1989; 196).
Although I share Rorty’s objective, I come up against two aspects of his exhortation that frustrate me. 
First, the tone impfies an assumption that his reader—or even American fiberals in general—^will all have 
a sense of themselves as privileged or a sense of belonging to the “us” group. I am his reader and I have a 
multi-lithic sense of myself, marginal in certain respects and in certain places and privileged in others.
My second frustration results fi:om his assumption that Christianity is more about the acceptance of a 
doctrine than a challenge to earthly hierarchy. Christianity’s primary focus for many people is not that 
everyone is a child of God, but rather that God is no respecter of persons (that is to say, their ranks and 
statuses mean little to God).
What is central to the Protestant tradition in which I was raised is the absence of a bounded “we”—^in 
Christ, Paul says in his letter to the Galatians, there is neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor fi'ee, male nor fe­
male (Chapter 3, verse 28). Some have interpreted this passage to mean that Christ does not challenge 
oppressive hierarchies and that anyone can be a Christian, regardless of how much they abuse their posi­
tion. But others (especially blacks who practiced Christianity in the United States fi:om the days of slavery 
to the days of the QvU Rights Movement) interpreted this statement conversely to mean that Christ does not 
recognize the status differences imposed by humans (Cone 1975). This is neither a denial that humanly 
sanctioned inequalities exist nor an erasure of difference, though clearly it can include both. Instead, it 
confirms that hierarchies, social exclusiveness, and abuses of power are human rather than divine inven­
tions.
My argmnent—distinct fi:om Rorty’s contention that, “ [f] rom a Christian standpoint, everyone, even 
the guards at Auschwitz or in the Gulag,” is a fellow sinner and must be loved equally (1991; 191)—^is that 
we are challenged to treat those we have been raised to see as our enemies and even those who have treated
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us as such as deserving of love. Loving everyone does not necessarily mean treating everyone equally. 
The challenge to love jusdy is meant to shape howwe behave from the moment we begin rhaking decisions. 
Rather than a protective blanket to avoid challenging cruelty, Christianity —qmte apart from the some­
times oppressive myths and occasionally exclusive doctrines that accompany it—can be a calculus for makmg 
distinctions based on something other than the statuses that are sanctioned by the cultures and societies in 
which we hve.
III. Examination Redux
Several months later, I return to Friendly’s. This time, another waitress, ten years my junior, sets my 
place, hands me a menu, and c^ me “Hon.”
I have brought the most recent issue of the feminist academic journal with me, and I open to the 
first article in the volnme. The topic: Women and Sex Work by Noah Zatz.“What is prostitution?” Zatz asks 
(1997:278). I worry as I eat my files, cole slaw, and turkey dub, “Is waitressing prostitution?” I read on.
“For the purposes of this article,” Zatz elaborates, “prostitution might be provisionally defined as at­
tending to the sexual dhsires of’a particuiar individual (or individuals) with bodily acts in exchange for 
payment of money” (1997:279). I sigh with relief; Zatz does not define attending to a person’s desires for 
food as prostitution. And yet I know that eating out meets many desires for people, not the least among 
them (almost any waitress will tell you about customers who demand sexual attention as well as demon­
strations of humility and speed) is ie desire to be served.
In this small and economically depressed dty—compared to the overwhelmingly wealthy, white vil­
lage where I live on the other side of the river—perhaps twdve percent of the population is African Ameri­
can. I look up from “Sex Work/Sex Act,” and I notice that the entire wait staff appears to be white and 
female, the manager is a white man, there are two white male cooks, and a Latino dishwasher. Is my wait­
ress aware that no blacks work at this restaurant? Perhaps. Would she guess this is the result of race dis­
crimination? I don’t know. Do these things weigh on her mind as much as the other challenges of her life? 
Probably not.
I do'know that she is kind to me. And it does not feel like the diffuse abstract politeness of those in the 
serving professions. Irfeels intentional; it feels radally motivated; it feels anti-racist; and I am grateful.
And suddenly, I’m embarrassed that I can eat out as often as I do, and I’m very thankful that I do not have a 
job that requires me to stand eight, ten, or twdve hours a day asking people what they want or what I can 
do for them. - .
This second experience at Friendly’s story catapults me back to my memory of the earlier one. The 
womm with my mother’s name was also a waitress. Our interaction could not help but have been affected [
by the fact that she was paid to wait on me. Our race, sex, and dass statuses no doubt entered into this i
interaction, shaping the way she responded to me as a customer and the way I responded to her as a wait­
ress. But I can’t say how. 'The exchange was formal and without affect. She treated me with the brevity of 
most of those who serve for a living and are tired (Leidner 1993). I am aware that the race system was 
salient/or me as I debated whether to push our interaction beyond formality to a levd of intimacy. Even
i
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that private debate, however, took place within the context of our different statuses: I entered the interac­
tion knowing more about her than she knew about me since she wore the uniform and the name tag.
Most of these thoughts were neither fully conscious nor dear to me while I was in the restaurant. What 
became clear to me later was the rather,simple realization that the sustained defense of radal purity has a 
high cost. Because the purity of any radal identity is a fantasy, maintaining the fantasy requires the perjury 
of everyone who abides it. White identity has been constructed in the United States as the absence of color 
(or, to use a phrase from earlier in the century, colored blood). My knowledge that identity is only chal­
lenged (and undermined) when it is unable to constantly re-instimte itself, as Diana Fuss would say (1991: 
24) was a challenge to me I fdt I did not meet. So when I left the restaurant I was not only feeling the missed 
opportunity to meet a distant cousin, I fdt as though I had been complidt in maintaining the fiction of white­
ness by my silence. Driving home, anger about the radal system and shame about my own racial stigma 
joined my initial guilt, and I was filled with both rage and remorse. No doubt this cavalcade of feelings— 
coupled with the fear of racial reprisal—^fueled the fervor with which I wrote the first version of this essay.
Only in hindsight have I realized that my dedsion not to engage the waitress was also mitigated by 
observing her fatigue and appredating her position in a low status job. As Rorty might say more pithily, my 
disengagement was acknowledgment, if only to myself, of her suffering. Rorty’s argument could be used to 
predict that my behavior—both the urge to reach out and the decision not to—^would be based on charac­
teristics we had in common. He would not, however, have predicted that one aspect of my calculus would 
be the bibfical imperative to treat another as I would wish to be treated (at least this is not explidt in Con- 
tingency). At the same time, to explain my dedsion not to reach out as doing my Christian duty is a slippery 
slope that allows me to avoid the multiple and less meritorious motivations—consdous and unconscious, 
altruistic and fearful—at work in what was for me a very uncomfortable moment.
IV. Democratic Ide^s and Multivalent Status Systems
When I returned home from the restaurant after the second visit, I was thinking about the challenge of 
reconciling democracy with this very stratified sodety in which we live. There is an inherent tension be­
tween democracy and stratification where genuine democracy works to undermine the meaningfulness of 
status difference. Sure Rorty had talked about democracy, or at least about a society that was wrestling with 
equality, I reopened Contingency and located the following passage.
I should like to [make an argument... for] a historical narrative about 
the rise of liberal institutions and customs—the institutions and customs 
which were designed to diminish cruelty, make possible government by 
the consent of the governed, and permit as much domination-free 
communication as possible to take place (Rorty 1989; 68).
I read this and wonder which of “our” liberal institutions he believes were designed to facilitate domina­
tion-free communication? Is this a nostalgic reading of the United States’, or for that matter Western Europe’s, 
past? What are the implications of the fact that he and I are citizens of the same country and yet are so 
different in the institutions where we put our faith?
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' I read KimberM Crenshaw’s critique of discriminatidn law. She documents the multiple occasions when
black women have been denied the right to file complaints based on both their race and sex. Why have they 
been denied this right? Because, she observes, Congress was composed of those who saw themselves as a 
monolithic norm, and, quite simply, its members “did not intend to protect compound classes.” Of course, 
Crenshaw acknowledges, in so fer as everyone identifies in terms of both race and sex, everyone belongs to 
a “compound class.” She elaborates the ramifications of this Congressional decision below:
The dominance'of the single-axis framework... not only marginalizes 
Black women but simultaneously privileges the subjectivity of white 
men... Black women are protected only to the extent that their 
experiences coincide with [either Black men or white women]. Where 
their experiences are distinct. Black women will encounter difficulty 
articulating their claims as long as approaches prevail which completely 
obscure problems ofintersectionality (Crenshaw (a) 1990:197).
The experience I have reiterated is only one demonstration that Crenshaw’s observations transcend the 
specificity of discrimination law. Here I was in a Friendly’s Restaurdnt, a most pedestrian, outside-die-court- 
room setting, hpdmtin'g to' articulate a claim that would reveal the Intersectionality of race, class and gen­
der and the relational ways in which I experience them. Against Crenshaw’s revelations, Rorty’s historical 
nirative of liberalism appears as romanticizing both the past and the future as it eschews “for instance,”a 
critical examination of liberalism and of its manifestation in our legal system.
Conclusion
‘If any one of them can explain it,’.said Alice Til give him sixpence.
I don’t believe there’s an atom of meaning in it.’
Alice in Wonderland, LeMs Carroll
Living as we do within so many constricted systems of identity and status can truly resemble the absur­
dity of Wonderland. What Rorty, Zatz and Crenshaw clarified for me is that the multiple statuses with which 
we label others and ourselves are neither absurd nor fihpricious. Even when they are unfair and troubling, 
they are also understandable and predictable, and their meanings and predictability make them easier to 
challenge.
More than Zatz or Crenshaw, however, Rorty challenges me because he questions the usefulness of 
the Judeo-Christian admonition with which I grew up, “Treat [all] others as you would wish to be treated.” 
His observation that people tend to treat those others with whom they have something in common as they 
would wish to be treated is a challenge to those of us who want to encourage compassion among each other 
while respecting the differences that give dur lives meaning. To simply expand the bounded we may not 
work in a society whose liberal institutions are founded on, to use Crenshaw’s phrase, a single axis frame­
work. Furthermore, I am not convinced,' as I think Rorty’s argument implies, that the Christian idea is syn­
onymous with equal treatment or is incommensurate with the recognition of difference.
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For those of us committed to the pursuit of domination-free communication and more genuine demo­
cratic hving, the challenge is to rework the foundation of our hberal institutions while we try at the same 
time to treat others as we would wish to be treated.
Swarthmore College
NOTES
1. Thanks to Ted Munter for the gift of Rorty’s Contingency, to conversations with Maris Gillette, Allyson 
Purpura, Lucius Outlaw, Paul Jefferson and Anna McLellan, and to the specific comments of Darrell Moore, 
Betty Sasaki, Michelle Hermann, Marie-Rose Logan, and Tiffeny Ford.
2. Although racial ahenation is not an unusual experience for people of color in the United States, it bears 
documenting and repeating, especially in this moment triien so many European Americans beheve that racism 
is essentially dead. As Kimberle Crenshaw observes, “Society’s adoption of the ambivalent rhetoric of equal 
opportunity law has made it that much more difficult for black people to name their reahty. There is no 
longer a perpetrator, a clearly identifiable discriminator [This] break with the past has formed the basis 
for the neoconservative claim that present inequities cannot be the result of discriminatory practices be­
cause this society no longer discriminates against blacks” (Crenshaw (b) 1995:107).
3. “Whiteness as Property” by Cheryl 1. Harris (1995) offers a wonderful, though disheartening, examina­
tion of the legacy of white supremacist law.
4. Not to be too cynical, but his explanation does leave me wondering whether I fit in to his category of 
“contemporary American hberal” or of “young black in an American city.” Am I, I wondered reading this, 
included in his original “we”?
5. Indeed Rorty would not be alone if he were to have winced (I realize diat I’m taking tremendous hberties 
here by using the fictional subjimctive when the author I am treating as an interlocuter is very much aUve). 
In one version of this essay, I was accused of presenting a “gendered” and “ineffective” argument—^which 
I translated as “throwing like a girl.” Admittedly, my argument conforms to a hberal thesis that locates the 
encouragement for citizens treating each other well with the Golden Rule rather than with the more pro­
gressive or radical thesis that pohhcaJ rights are the dessert of everyone. While I am not sonjeone who thinks 
that hberals are “hke girls” and radicals and conservatives, in other words anyone with a more extreme 
position, is “hke a boy,” I have thought about the critique and now make an argument that demands rights 
while at the same time encourages mutual civihty.
6. Some authors (Hah 1992, Gilroy 1993, Winant 1994) have argued that this race hierarchy is worldwide.
7. Indeed, the recognition by non-whites that whiteness gamers status is not synonymous with the wish to 
be white. Similarly, the recognition by women that maleness gamers status does not mean that most women 
want to be men.
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8 “fClreating a more expansive sense of soUdarity than we presendy have [with others]” (Rorty 1989:
196) is atremendous but crucial challenge. It is dependent, I beUeve. on-among other things-a secure 
sense of ourselves and the many aspects of our identides, secure in our sense of ourselves as enhded an 
engaged, and secure in the spaces and organizations we inhabit and in which we partiapate. Indeed, I want 
to ax^t that my sense of myself as multi-Uthic is both advantageous and problematic for my abihty to reach
out in sohdarity with others.
9 Without argument, Christianity is interpreted broadly by those who consider themselves Christian. Here
I am primarily concerned with the message rather than with various doctrines espoused by the many de­
nominations of the Church.
10. Rorty rightly observes, however, that to consider everyone a fellow sinner is an invitation to moral per­
fection that is emphasized in Christianity (1991:191)-
II Injustice and the Pomes of Difference (1990), Iris Marion Young argues that justice is not synony­
mous with equal treatment. Indeed, she observes, unequal treatment may, especially m cases mvolvmg 
members of disadvantaged groups, be more just than treating such persons exactly the same.
12.1 am tempted to refer to Christianity without a capital “c” for the sake of distinguishing between the 
Church and the message. The Church has, in myriad ways, modeled itself after gove^ental hierarchies, 
excluding and denigrating individuals and groups, passing judgement (with occasionally fatal consequence), 
and stingily doling out forgiveness. The message of Christ is, paradoxically, a challenge agamst these thmgs.
13.1 hope it is clear that I embrace Christianity because I find it to be consistent with anti-nationalism anti­
patriotism, and radical democracy. I befieve the uncritical and complete embrace of any method for hvmg 
is dangerous, and I hope to have conveyed as much.
14. To what extent my interpretation of her behavior is my own projection, I don’t know “ [W] e just don’t 
know how to really listen to Others and absolutely refuse to admit there is any form of the human expen- 
ence we cannot analyze and comprehend. We confuse sympathy with empathy, and our own constmctions 
for the viewfrom somewhere very else” 0ay Lemke, CUNY, contribution to internet conversation on Ebomes 
1/13/97, xmca@weber.ucsd.edu fist).
15 “Prostitutes’ own testimony that their activities may be just another job suggests, however, that they may 
not be providing the sanie thing that the efient is receiving... ’I think women and men and feminists have to 
realize that all workinvolves seUing some part ofyour body. You might sellyour brain^^you might sellyour 
back you might sell your fingers for typewriting. 'Whatever it is that you do you are sellng one part of your 
body’.. .’(Pheterson 1989,146). Of course, her client quite Ukely</oes think of her vagina as very different
than her back or fingers because it is a locus of his erotic desire” (Zatz 1997:292).
16 Who had the authority in my interaction with the waitress, bodies branded as female, one clearly 
black, the other clearly working class? “The white male body is the relay to le^Timation but even more 
than that, the power to suppress that body, to cover its tracks and its traces, is the si^dreal authonty, 
according to constitutional fashion. Needless to say, [all] American women and [all] Afncan-Amencans 
have never had the privilege to suppress the body (Berlant 1991- 113).
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17. To Rorty’s credit, he specifies exactly what he has in mind in the project. It is not an abstract utopic 
ideal: “[0]ne [should] give ‘we’ as concrete and historically specific a sense as possible: It will mean 
something Uke ‘we twentieth-century liberals’ or ‘we heirs to the historical contingencies which have cre­
ated more and more cosmopolitan, more and more democratic pofitical institutions’ (Rorty 1989:196-7).
18. Other refigious traditions may also espouse this directive but I am unfamiliar with them.
19. In so fer as the message of Christianity (and if we understand it as having its genesis in the Ten Com­
mandments of the Old Testament, Judaic morality as well) challenges the authority of one perspective, it is 
a message of radical inclusion. And radical inclusion is, finally, the goal of those of us attempting to appre­
ciate the intersections of the race, class and sex-gender systems in our analyses of social life.
